tory power. Factor analysis is employed to obtain summary measures of socio-economic development. As shown in Table 1 , rotated factors of these fifteen variables (Kaiser Varimax rotation) reveal two dimensions of socio-economic development in Japanese prefectures. The first factor shows high loadings on percent urban population, percent population in shibu, 8 per capita income, economic growth rate, percent population in industrial sectors, and others. A total of ten variables load highly on this factor. AIl seem to be related to the degree of urbanization or industrialization. Hence, we identify this factor as the urban-industrialism dimension. The second factor is strongly correlated with five variables: per capita electric power production, newspaper circulation, paved roads, number of automobiles, and per capita library facility.4 This factor appears to indicate the amount of social overhead capital investment in prefectures. It is labeled as the social overhead capital dimension.
With respect to the measurement of democratic development, Neubauer's index of democratic development is used with some modifications. 5 Seven political variables are chosen for analysis because they are presumed to be related to some key features of political democracy: electoral participation, electoral competition, and representation equality. These variables are factor analyzed and the results are reported in Table 2 . It is clear in the data that democratic development in Japanese prefectures consists of three distinctive dimensions. The first factor shows high loadings on the percentage of votes received by the winning party in prefectural elections, the percentage of time the dominant party has controlled the prefectural assembly, and the percentage of assembly
• Shibu is a Japanese term for urban part as distinguished from gumbu or rural areas. It is an administrative unit which often includes a substantial area that we would normally regard as rural. The Japanese census uses a different definition of urban areas, namely the density of population. Thus, these two measures of urbanization do not completely overlap, the correlation between them being .78.
• Per capita library facility is a composite score of the number of public libraries and the number of volumes they contain.
• Dean E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61 (December 1967), 1002-1009. • Japanese women gained voting rights for the first time in 1947. Therefore, female voting turnout and male/female voting ratio may be sensitive measures of political participation in the Japanese context. 7 The representation index is designed to tab the degree of equality in representation. Assuming that the oneman-one-vote principle is a basic element of political democracy, this index calculates the degree of overor under-representation in terms of the number of assembly seats won and the percentage of popular votes received by each competing party. The formula is:
Absolute Sum of Differentials in % of Seats 
Number of Parties Competing in Prefectural Election
The reason for dividing the numerator by the number of competing parties in the formula is because of the varying number of parties actually competing in prefectural elections. For example, in the 1965 Tokyo To election there were seven competing parties including the Liberal Democrats, Socialists, Komeito candidates, Communists, Independents, and other minor parties, whereas in the 1967 Akita election only four parties competed shows a high loading on the third factor. A close examination of the between-item intercorrelations of all variables considered also reveals that the representation index is not significantly correlated with any other variable. This indicates that the degree of representation equality is one distinct dimension of democratic development. The third factor is labeled as the representation dimension.
Using only those variables which load highly on the urban-industrialism dimension, a separate factor analysis is performed in order to construct an urban-industrialism scale. From this result, we further factor score each prefecture. Similar procedures are employed to create scales for social overhead capital, competition, participation, and representation equality.
II. Results
If we are to confirm the Lipset-Cutright hypothesis in Japanese prefectures, we need to observe sufficiently strong and positive correlations between the two measures of socio-economic development and the three measures of democratic development. The results of analysis are presented in Table 3 . It is clear that the degree of urban-industrialism is neither strongly nor positively correlated with all measures of democracy. Urban-industrialism shows a strong negative correlation with the level of participation (r = -.743) and bears no visible relation to representation equality (r = .092).
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The amount of social overhead capital, our second measure of socio-economic development, fares no better. It shows very weak relationships with the level of participation (r = .142), competition (r = .086), and representation equality (r = -.134). Thus, the present analysis of within-nation variations in socioeconomic development and political democracy in Japan offers little evidence to confirm the generalizations regarding economic-political linkages previously reported in several cross-national studies. The findings presented here suggest that socio-economic factors such as the level of urbanization, industrialization, education, or communications development provide an inadequate explanation for the varying levels of political democracy in Japanese prefectures. 8 These findings would be more valid, however, were the analysis performed in more than one nation. Further research on within-nation variations is needed to test conclusively the Lipset-Cutright hypothesis.
'I have offered elsewhere some speculations about the nature of economic-political linkages in Japanese prefectures. See my "Economic Development and Democracy in Japanese Prefectures," Report No. 29, Laboratory for Political Research, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa (July, 1969) .
